Ethnicity and Religion in International Politics:  The Middle East, the Balkans, and India-Pakistan

Executive Summary

On September 19, COSSA held its third and final congressional briefing of the year.  The session, entitled Ethnicity and Religion in International Politics:  The Middle East, the Balkans, and India-Pakistan, focused on how underlying ethnic and religious tensions have led to conflict and impact international political decisions.

Lessons Learned from the Balkans

Susan Woodward, Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York’s Graduate Center, discussed the lessons we have learned from the conflict in the Balkans.  She opened by positing that the Yugoslav conflict “had a formative influence on our thinking about conflict in the post-Cold War era and     

 secondly, about how to deal with those conflicts.” She backed this by noting that many organizations used the clash “as a way of reforming and adjusting their own” practices and that the U.S. military, NATO, the UN, and the World Bank were all transformed by it.                                                                     Devin Haggerty, William Quandt, Susan Woodward

Woodward then laid out three key conclusions that political leaders have drawn from the tensions in the Balkans:

·          The new threat to international peace and security was ethnic and religious conflict.

·          These kinds of conflicts were caused by long-simmering, historically-based hatreds, which either the Cold War or authoritarian governments, or both, had kept under wraps and repressed. 

·          The idea that both politics and political conflict was generally no longer about ideology, but about identity.  And the struggle was largely between civic or liberal identities on the one hand, and ethnic, religious, national, and racial identities on the other.

She also explained that these conclusions go hand in hand with strategic lessons that have been drawn by policymakers studying the Yugoslav conflict:  1) bombing works to change the military balance and bring people to the bargaining table, 2) sanctions work to get rid of rogue regimes, and 3) power-sharing principles involving the leaders of armed groups are the best way to accommodate ethnic conflict and a war.

Woodward next discussed the social science tenets on ethnic conflict, the study and formulation of which was prompted in large part by the hostility in the Balkans.  She noted that contrary to prevailing thought, “the more ethnically heterogeneous and pluralistic a society, the more likely it is to be peaceful and democratic.”  In addition, the process of democratization is highly vulnerable to violence. Research has also shown that the longer a civil war lasts and the higher the number proportionally of casualties, “the far more difficult it is to restore peace and get the country back on track.” 

To conclude, Woodward asked and answered the question, “What do these lessons suggest for policy?”  She did so from a social science perspective, countering some of the inferences she noted earlier had been drawn by those in political positions.  She asserted that it’s important to be careful about what is labeled ethnic or religious conflict.  Such a designation can empower fundamentalists and further destabilize a region.  Woodward also stated that it’s important to act early and coherently in an area threatened by ethnic or religious clash.  Another rule is that bombing alone cannot solve problems – air power must be supplemented by ground forces.  Finally, it is vital to recognize that bombing and sanctions can actually strengthen the position of a rogue leader.  As Woodward noted, “It makes it much easier for (such an individual) to rule at home in the way they want, and to justify expenditures on repression.”

The Indo-Pakistani Dispute Over Kashmir

Devin Haggerty, Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, addressed the ethnic conflict that has raged over Kashmir and the stresses it has caused to the relationship between India and Pakistan.  He began by laying out the historical record and explaining that Hindu-Muslim relations have only been marked by massive carnage during the twentieth century, not much earlier as is often depicted.  The tensions have strained greatly since the British colonists started the process of ceding power back to the people of India.

As the notion of democracy spread, the “Muslim minority grew increasingly anxious about its political prospects in a future India absent the British.”  This, as Haggerty continued, ultimately led to “the 1940 demand for a state called Pakistan that would be separate from, and have a distinct sovereignty from Hindu-majority India.”  Ultimately, Pakistan was established as the British formally withdrew in 1946-47.  During the partition process “some fifteen million people moved from one side of the border to the other, still considered today to be one of the largest, if not the largest, mass movements of population in all of human history.”

Haggerty next explained the origin of the dispute over Kashmir, noting that “at the time of  partition, the British unfortunately left a quite vague prescription for” how the roughly 500 princely states of British India should be divided between India and Pakistan.  Geographic contiguity generally solved this problem, but the border state of Kashmir posed a dilemma as it held a Muslim majority but was ruled by a Hindu prince. 

Almost immediately the sides opened armed conflict in the region and the United Nations (UN) intervened in a effort to forge a settlement.  Haggerty noted that “the UN position on Kashmir then and today continues to call for a referendum amongst the people of Kashmir that will decide the political status of the state.”  But a vote has never been held and the fighting has continued on and off since the late 1940s. 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a period of relative stability between the two sides, but during this time Pakistan’s government adopted a robust Islamic tone under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, who came to power in a coup.  Haggerty also explained that in India at the same time, the governments of Indira Ghandi and Rajiv Ghandi moved the country away from secularism towards Hindu nationalism. 

In 1989 a local uprising in Kashmir against the Indian government gained steam and the material support of Pakistan.  Since that time, the standoff has been marked by periods of bloodshed and increasing ethnic division.  And as Haggerty pointed out, the conflict has been made immensely more complex in the last five years by the emergence of the two states as overt possessors of nuclear weapons, which has led to a vastly increased level of international interest and involvement.

Haggerty concluded by asserting that United States would be best served by refusing to depict the dispute as an ethnic conflict.  Rather, U.S. leaders should continue to handle the situation as they would a political dispute between two sovereign nations.  He noted that this situation is complicated by the ongoing war against terror and the necessity to keep both states as allies.  This makes mediation difficult and an immediate solution to the clash unlikely.

The Drift Toward War with Iraq

William Quandt, Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, focused his presentation on Iraq as a problem in American foreign policy.  To open, he gave a timeline of relations between the two states over the last twenty years.  In 1984, the U.S. renewed diplomatic relations with Iraq (they had been suspended since 1967) owing to our interests in the Middle East and our worry that Iran might become too powerful if it won the war waging between the nations. 

To aid Iraq during this period, we sent billions of dollars worth of Agricultural credits and allowed allies, such as Saudi Arabia, to transfer military equipment, related Quandt.  After the war ended in a stalemate, the U.S. tried to engage Saddam Hussein but “the Bush Administration in August of 1990 woke up and realized that Saddam had ambitions of his own and had taken our moderation in engagement as a kind of green light for him to do what he wanted.” 

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait later that year led to the brief Gulf War and Quandt related that since then we’ve decided largely to contain Iraq and deter Hussein from threatening other Middle East states.  Quandt asserted that this strategy has largely been a success and he questioned why we are all of a sudden now calling for Hussein’s ouster. 

To this end, he laid out five concerns he has about the Bush Administration’s rush to go to war:

·          Iraq isn’t presenting anything new in terms of potential threats.

·          The chances are now much greater than in the Gulf War that Hussein will use chemical or biological weapons against our troops.  The is due to our pre-announced goal of regime change.

·          Shifting our focus to a war against Iraq compromises our ability to continue the campaign against terrorism.

·          Taking on Iraq without international backing is risky because it highlights the fact that the U.S. views itself as able to do whatever it wants, whenever it wants.  This will greatly hinder our standing in the world community.

Quandt’s fifth point relates to the ethnic tension in Iraq’s population and how it will play out if Hussein is removed from power.  Democratization will be difficult because of the disparate groups that live in Iraq.  Sixty percent of the people are Shiite Muslims, 20 percent are Sunni Muslims, and 20 percent are Kurds. 

Despite their majority status, the Shiites have been the group most discriminated against, explained Quandt.  The Sunnis have typically been the privileged segment of society, and they worry greatly about what will happen if there’s a democratic government.  The Kurds are in an odd situation.  They generally live in northern Iraq, which is “essentially a self-governing autonomous area, with a degree of democracy,” and they “are a bit worried about whether their privileged position    . . . is going to survive a transition to the new Iraq.”  Quandt noted that whoever serves as the head of a post-Hussein government would have to do quite a juggling act to meet the demands of all the groups.

COSSA will prepare edited transcripts of the seminar, which included a question and answer period.  These should be available by the end of November.  If you would like a copy, please e-mail cossa@cossa.org.